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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report is the result of research conducted by the Centre for City Criminology at City, University 
of London, in partnership with Islington’s Integrated Gangs Team (IGT) and the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS). The research was co-funded by MPS and the School of Arts and Social Sciences, City, 
University of London. Following a collaborative research event in October 2017, City Criminologists 
were commissioned to carry out a small-scale research project to capture the work of the IGT and 
to make recommendations regarding its operations, coherence, effectiveness and sustainability. 
The research team conducted semi-structured interviews over several months with 23 practitioners 
across the services that constitute the IGT. This report presents the findings and recommendations. 
Findings 
1. The Perceived Risk Factors behind Serious Youth Violence in Islington
Participants’ views on the factors behind Serious Youth Violence (SYV) in Islington accord with 
existing research. The problems accompanying socio-economic deprivation are prevalent. Islington 
is relatively typical but may also have local features, particularly extreme inequality. 
2. Origins of the IGT
The IGT emerged out of pragmatic attempts to provide the most relevant and effective services with 
available resources in a period of austerity and a spike in SYV. This involved adapting what existed 
to new prerogatives at national and local level. The aspiration was that an integrated approach 
would combine the strengths of a range of partner agencies.  
3. Workings of the IGT
The IGT is a well-resourced group able to intervene swiftly and decisively to safeguard young people, 
providing a ‘wraparound service’ that looks to their needs, circumstances and behaviour. This 
approach requires partnership working and information sharing between the different agencies.  
4. Strengths of the IGT
While participants recognised that the language of ‘safeguarding’ can camouflage more robust 
enforcement, all demonstrated a clear commitment to the welfare of young people. 
The IGT’s success draws in part from the co-location of partner agencies. The team’s effectiveness 
is not accidental; it reflects sustained political and financial support, and the capacity to unite 
excellent staff and good-will around a shared purpose. 
The willingness to engage flexibly with concepts like ‘the gang’ and instruments like the Gangs 
Matrix, about which participants raised concerns, demonstrates a useful pragmatism. 
5. Weaknesses of the IGT
Participants noted that tensions arising from differing occupational cultures, operational 
assumptions and perceived and actual power imbalances can complicate the IGT’s work; the 
literature confirms these tensions as a common feature of multi-agency partnership working. 
Additionally, different agencies have different attitudes to particular types of information: information 
sharing is not always automatic, and there is not always consensus on action. 
Deficits in the membership of the team were noted to exist in housing and education, and concerns 
were expressed that mental health resources are low for young adults.
Building stronger links with the community remains a challenge and a priority.
4Recommendations 
1.  Ethos: reinforce the IGT’s safeguarding ethos by routinely revisiting how it can be 
operationalised across the range of partners and activities that inform the team’s work. 
2.  Co-Location: maintain the principle of co-location as a defining characteristic of the 
Islington IGT. 
3.  Name: consider whether the IGT’s name adequately reflects the range of activities and 
cohorts with which it engages, given the controversies attached to the term ‘gang’. 
4.  Data Sources: re-examine the role and use of the Gang’s Matrix and its interaction with 
other databases in the work of the IGT.
5.  Partnership Working: include personnel from housing, education and health, and re-
embed probation.  
6.  Sharing Best Practice: develop a more systematic, pan-London method for identifying and 
sharing best practice, what works and continuous learning.  
7.  Information Sharing: clarify the agency-specific and legal constraints around information 
sharing within the IGT and between Boroughs to address perceived asymmetries.
8.  Effectiveness: develop an integrated framework for measuring ‘effectiveness’ that 
systematically incorporates multiple indicators within the partnership.
9.  Community Links: work with young people, educational services and the wider population 
to build stronger community links and co-produce a safer Islington.
10.  Resources: leverage resources within other parts of Islington Council (skills, culture, 
employability), private and FE/HE sectors to enhance young people’s life chances.
6. Future Developments and Challenges 
Alongside addressing the above challenges, participants noted the importance of effectively 
evaluating the IGT’s success. Narrow and potentially unrelated indices, like general offending rates, 
may not be the most appropriate measures. A wide variety of indicators capturing both incremental 
and sustained outcomes could be recognised and endorsed.  
Issues for Future Research  
Future research should:  
1.  engage with young people and the wider community to understand what they think of the police, 
the IGT, ‘gangs’, the Gangs Matrix, SYV, life chances, and the circumstances under which at-risk 
young people might be more likely to engage with relevant services. 
2. contribute to the development of a framework for co-producing a safer Islington.
3.  look at the impact of disproportionality within the youth and criminal justice system in relation to 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups in Islington.
4. examine the role of ‘county lines’ as a contributor to gang affiliation and SYV in Islington. 
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1. Background to the Research
This research came about following contact from Islington Council to examine ways in which 
researchers at City, University of London might contribute to local community initiatives and 
projects. In late 2017, Criminologists at the Centre for City Criminology invited a group of Islington 
practitioners, mostly attached to the Integrated Gangs Team (IGT) and the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS), to the University for an afternoon to discuss existing research on serious youth 
violence (SYV), the current situation in Islington, and the practices of and challenges faced by the 
IGT. This initial event resulted in a series of discussions around how City Criminologists might add 
value to the work of the IGT by conducting a short research project. Further exploratory discussions 
resulted in the co-production of the four key research questions that inform this report:    
1.  Is there an ‘Islington approach’ to tackling serious youth violence, and in what ways do members 
of the Islington IGT see this approach as distinct from others? 
2.  How do IGT members evaluate effectiveness and impact in tackling SYV in the borough, and 
what additional data sources might be used or developed to inform more rigorous or reliable 
evaluation? 
3.  According to IGT members, what are the key strengths and limitations of the tools made centrally 
available to the IGT and what improvements might be useful? 
4.  According to IGT members, what operational risks and opportunities does the IGT face 
going forward?
The research was match funded by the MPS and the School of Arts and Social Sciences, City, University 
of London to a total of £10,000. It was agreed early on that this initial research project would be 
inward-looking – focusing on the operational ethos, working practices, inter-agency tensions and 
challenges faced by the IGT – rather that outward-looking – examining the views and experiences 
of young people and the wider community who are affected by SYV and the IGT’s work to address it. 
This was a pragmatic decision based on available resources and timeframes. The research process 
has reinforced the early recognition by all parties that the voices of young people and the wider 
community must be central to any attempt to develop an in depth understanding of SYV in Islington. 
Should a larger piece of research follow from this initial project, the focus would be expanded to 
include the full range of individuals and institutions touched by SYV in the local community.  
2. Research Context: Gangs and Serious Youth Violence
The problems involved in identifying and defining gang affiliation have been evident since the 
pioneering gang research of Frederic Thrasher (1927) in Chicago nearly a century ago. As Maxson 
and Klein (2006: 4) note, the ‘definitional issue has probably been the stickiest one that gang 
scholars have had to confront’. Less charitably, Hagedorn (2008: 245) refers to ‘criminology’s 
nit-picking definitional fixation on “what is a gang”’. Indeed, academic research has become 
embroiled in a bruising dispute over meanings and classifications. One set of scholars argues that 
local identity and group conflict are an enduring feature of working-class life, and consequently 
that territorial ‘gangs’ are nothing new (Alexander 2000; Hallsworth and Young 2008; Hallsworth 
2013; Wilson 2016). As such, categorisation of this behaviour as ‘gang-related’ represents a form of 
academic entrepreneurialism (Hallsworth 2011) that cloaks racialised stereotypes and uncritically 
replicates police agendas (Williams 2015). Other researchers contend that new street-based groups 
have emerged for whom the term ‘gang’ is a meaningful descriptor (Pitts 2008, 2011). From this 
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in the context of austerity, illicit opportunity, and consumer culture (Densley 2013; Storrod and 
Densley 2017; McLean et al. 2018). For Ilan (2015: 77) the term ‘gangs’ can mean different things 
in different settings and when, for example, ‘US-derived gangs definitions are applied in a global 
context, they arguably begin to fray’. 
There is more consensus when it comes to diagnoses of the issue, with scholars seemingly converging 
around a set of structural factors, albeit with differences according to exact emphasis and whether 
the resulting criminality is defined as ‘gang-related’ or ‘Serious Youth Violence’ (SYV) (Armstrong 
and Rosbrook-Thompson, 2016). The role of material deprivation (Densley 2013; Harding 2014; Pitts 
2008) and, furthermore, processes of neoliberal globalisation that see similar forms of deprivation 
reproduced in urban locations around the world (Fraser 2015; Ilan, 2015; Gunter 2017), are stressed 
by many researchers. With adolescence being a period of transgression (Gunter 2017; Hallsworth 
2011), the form and extent of transgression will be shaped by both the severity of deprivation and local 
particularities such as opportunities made available by the underground economy (Fraser 2015).  
Research on gang desistance indicates that gang members tend to exit gangs both ‘abruptly’ and 
‘gradually’ (Decker and Lauritsen 2002), and that the timing of exits is partly based on the fluctuating 
size and influence of gangs themselves (Densley 2013). A key concept here is ‘maturational reform’ 
(Matza 1964), with the passage into adulthood and its attendant responsibilities prompting a move 
away from crime. In the context of gang membership, it is the demands of education, employment, 
marriage and family life that can bring about desistance (Laub and Sampson 2003; Thornberry 
et al. 2003). More specifically, Densley’s (2013) study of 12 London gangs found that maturation 
brought a recognition of the impact of gang membership (on gang members themselves, as well as 
on their victims and personal relationships), while pressure from a partner, the responsibilities of 
parenthood, a serious injury or bereavement, and contact with the criminal justice system were also 
conducive to desistance.
Agents of criminal justice have been less conflicted than academics in adopting and operationalising 
gang terminology. Gang rhetoric has become embedded in the bureaucracies of criminal justice, 
most notably in the maintenance of databases comprising suspected gang members (Spergel 2009: 
667; Barrows and Huff 2009) and in efforts to codify gang-affiliation into law (Siegel 2003). In the 
United States, such practices are well established (Bjerregaard 2003: 172), with debates being 
sparked as to the legality and morality of gang databases (Siegel 2003; Spergel 2009), and proof of 
gang-membership resulting in up-tariff sentencing or the invoking of federal law (Hagedorn 2008; 
Bjerregaard 2015). In the United Kingdom, a comparable effort to respond to gang membership has 
gathered momentum in the form of police intelligence databases (Fraser and Atkinson 2014), civil 
gang injunctions (Treadwell and Gooch 2015) and – most controversially – the application of the 
common law principle of joint enterprise in prosecution (House of Commons 2015; Williams and 
Clarke 2016).  
A recent investigation of the MPS’ Gangs Matrix (Amnesty 2018) found that its databases lacked 
robust procedural practices for classifying individuals as ‘gang-affiliated’ and a sound legal 
justification for retaining and sharing personal data. Its authors noted that, ‘indicators used ... 
to identify ‘gang members’ simply reflect elements of urban youth culture and identity that have 
nothing to do with serious crime’ (Amnesty 2018: 3). This was significant given that individuals 
listed on such databases were subject to adverse outcomes involving housing providers, schools 
and/or employment agencies on the basis of data-sharing protocols. Also notable in this context is 
the highly racialised nature of these practices (Alexander 2008). As Williams and Clarke discovered, 
87% of nominals on the London gang database were Black, Asian or minority ethnic (Williams and 
Clarke 2016). 
73. Research Questions and Methodology
The report is based on 23 interviews with individual members of and stakeholders in the Islington 
IGT. Interviews were semi-structured, informed by the four primary research questions identified 
above, and agreed at the outset with senior members of the IGT. The semi-structured nature of the 
research interview process created a flexible space from which a range of salient topics emerged. 
These topics related to the origins of the IGT, its underpinning rationale, the usefulness and/or 
necessity of the term ‘gang’ for the IGT’s work, the nature and causes of Serious Youth Violence 
(SYV) in Islington, definitions of success, key absences from the Team, and the most significant 
challenges it would face in future. The interview schedule also allowed for follow-up questions, 
particularly concerning any emergent themes, with interviews ranging from 41 minutes to 68 minutes 
in duration. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded in order to identify the core and 
axial themes that feature in this report. Interviews are cited in the report with a letter (A,B,C…) 
corresponding to the interviewer, and a number (1,2,3…) corresponding to the interviewee. 
4. What do IGT Members Believe is Behind SYV in Islington?
The approach to tacking youth crime outlined in Working Together for a Safer Islington focuses 
on structural and cultural risk factors over individual pathologies. This approach informs and 
underpins the prioritisation of welfare over punishment and the collaborative, strengths- and 
trauma-based ethos centred on safeguarding which recognises young people as victims as well as 
perpetrators. Though this philosophy was largely reflected in IGT members’ diagnoses of SYV in 
Islington, a number of individual and family problems, as well as a set of technological factors, were 
also identified. Furthermore, there was variation in extent to which psychologistic framing (F1) was 
linked to structural issues (D3).
4.1 Structural/cultural risk factors
Most interviewees cited a series of structural and cultural risk factors believed to underpin SYV 
and other crime in Islington. These factors included poor quality housing, overcrowding, a lack of 
both diversionary activities and job opportunities, and a corrosive sense of the lack of a ‘legitimate’ 
future. The detrimental impact of funding cuts to the MPS and youth services was another point of 
consensus. A reduction in the number of youth workers was bemoaned by many participants (though 
the number of youth clubs, centres and other resources may not have actually reduced). However, 
two IGT police officers saw youth clubs as part of the problem; they were being used as recruiting 
grounds for gangs (A5; G1). For one non-statutory member, cuts to police budgets had resulted in 
more ‘cost-effective’ methods of policing such as monitoring social media sites like YouTube, Twitter 
and Facebook (E2). Significantly, this monitoring has been recommended by the Home Office (2012) 
and further validated by the creation of the MPS Social Media Hub in 2018 (Trendall 2018). For many 
interviewees the decline of neighbourhood policing and a corresponding lack of systematic police 
engagement with young people had contributed to officers being seen as ‘the enemy’ (A3). A related 
problem was a paucity of young police officers from BAME backgrounds. As one officer put it, ‘We 
need people that the gangs can identify with. They’ve probably got to be slightly younger people… 
I think sometimes they’ve got to be BME individuals’ (A3). Multi-agency outreach work could also 
undermined by young people refusing to engage with IGT members and relevant services because 
of an awareness of the connections between agencies (E2).
Inequality was another recurring theme in interviews with IGT staff, many of whom echoed the 
Islington Fairness Commission’s (2012) identification of ‘Two Islingtons’. One participant described 
a polarised borough where middle-class and working-class children lived ‘separate lives’ (E2). There 
was less consensus on gentrification and how it might accentuate this polarisation. Whereas one 
participant spoke of gentrification intensifying young people’s desire ‘to hold on to what they have’ 
8(C4), another argued that these youngsters’ horizons did not encompass the parts of the borough 
that had been gentrified. As they put it: “This is the thing about localising, I think everything is just 
about looking down and looking now, rather than looking out” (C3). This view was reinforced by 
another IGT member who described money generated by criminal enterprise being ‘worn’ rather 
than channelled into more legitimate activities (B1).
More explicit discussion of exclusion was evident in relation to schools. Although available research 
cannot determine whether school exclusions are causally linked to offending (Obsuth et al, 2014) 
there is an established evidence base to suggest that excluded children are at much greater risk of 
becoming either perpetrators or victims of serious youth violence (Deakin and Kupchik, 2018; McAra 
and McVie, 2010). Furthermore, there are multiple critiques of zero tolerance policies, filtered down 
from the criminal justice system into schools, resulting in already marginalised and vulnerable 
young people being excluded from mainstream education (e.g. Taylor et al., 2018; Timpson, 2019). 
Though efforts to reduce the number of young people excluded from school and placed in alternative 
provision has resulted in a decline since 2015 (Working Together for a Safer Islington 2016), some 
participants complained that schools’ exclusionary practices can be fuelled by a containment 
mentality (B1; C4). 
The experience of trauma and its possible connection with material deprivation was discussed by 
one participant: ‘whether it’s to do with poverty and things like that… it could be’ (B3). For another 
participant, it was not just trauma but the significance of undiagnosed mental health issues and 
learning difficulties that was being overlooked (B1). As well as increasing the likelihood of both 
school expulsion and, especially for young women, sexual exploitation (B2), the marginalisation 
and bullying associated with these issues can see the emergence of group solidarities and related 
affordances (protection from bullying, etc.) that eventually are manifested in SYV (Cowie and Myers, 
2017). Similar findings have been reported in a study into the links between schools and gangs 
commissioned by the NASUWT (Broadhurst et al., 2008).
The defensive function of gangs was also stressed by participants, with these groups acting as ‘safe-
havens’ for young people feeling threatened by their peers (E1). Some suggested that young people 
carry knives for self-defence (B4; E2). Others sought to frame weapon-carrying as a cultural issue, 
and remarked that for those inculcated into a culture of violence from an early age, carrying a knife 
may be ‘normal’. Euphemistic ways of talking about stabbing (e.g. ‘poking’) were also mentioned 
in diagnoses of SYV (E2), and it was proposed that this distancing language might contribute to 
desensitising young people to the realities of violence (C3). One participant speculated about the 
potentially dangerous influence of computer games and, in particular, hours spent playing the first-
person ‘shoot ‘em up’, Call of Duty (E2). The ‘media effects’ debate has been ongoing for decades, 
and is informed by research that varies enormously in quality (Greer, 2010; Greer and McLaughlin, 
2017). The research evidence on the effects of computer games on violent attitudes and behaviour 
remains inconclusive. Yet such instinctive views still hold purchase, even among practitioners who 
deal up-close with serious youth violence on a daily basis. 
One police officer offered their view of the national and local underpinnings of SYV in UK and 
Islington, together with the role of drugs markets in generating violence through competition: ‘gang 
violence doesn’t come… with gangs, per se, but it comes with drug markets and the saturation of 
drug markets, so the competition for that space’ (A2).
4.2 Family/Psychological factors
Another factor identified by participants was the mind-set of young people. Frequently, the most 
reckless offenders are the youngest because they lack maturity. But the youngest people are also 
often the most exploited. Their approach to life was described as ‘short-termist’ by one participant 
(C4), and another argued that this short-termism adversely affects the choices young people make 
(C2). Technology further amplifies young peoples’ short-termism with respect to both time and 
9space; workers from across the IGT described how local happenings conveyed on social media sites 
– including violent attacks – preoccupied young people while fuelling a perceived need to respond 
quickly and, almost invariably, rashly. With a global city on their doorstep young people’s horizons 
remained intensely local. Social media sites were also implicated in the recruitment of gang members 
(E2), while the materials uploaded to such sites, especially drill music videos, cemented certain 
masculine scripts around pride, reputation and reprisal. One participant also noted the possibility 
of masculinity being amplified in the private realm because of the labour market offering so few 
opportunities to young men:  
Part of that comes from what they see in society in terms of some dysfunctional and/or ‘broken homes’ and 
also from a lack of communication skills, in terms of how you talk to women (C3). 
Family life was another locus of dysfunction. One participant spoke of broken families where mental 
health and substance misuse problems, among both parents and children, were common. In some 
cases, parents had drug-related debt and young men had been forced into a breadwinner role. As 
one interviewee described: ‘sometimes they might have a parent that’s a drug user who owes a drug 
debt, that has to pay that debt off. Or they’re having to... step up and be a bit of a breadwinner… I 
don’t like using that word, but there’s a lot of pressure on young males to step up and earn money 
for their families’ (E1). Another generational factor was young people’s familiarity with prison (E2) 
through their parents’ experiences of being held in custody. 
With no structure at home, a sense of order – as well as feelings of acceptance, protection and 
solidarity – was sought elsewhere (E1). The ‘gang as family’ motif – a commonplace in the literature 
on gang membership – thus emerged. It was interesting to note, however, that notions of gang 
structure and hierarchy could themselves be under threat. As one participant described: 
I think maybe 20 years ago there was structure within gangs. A younger person could never go to an 
older person in another gang and threaten to attack them. There had to be a system of command.  What’s 
happening now, there is no structure and invariably what you will find is that a lot of the issues tend 
to come from the youngers who have been bandied about, are reckless, and that’s because there is no 
structure, there is no guidance, if you like. (C3)
Taken together, the factors identified above have created a group of people who lack certain basic 
life skills and have no firm sense of the future (C4). As one participant said of young people, ‘Some of 
them don’t even know how to boil an egg. So, we’re talking about basic stuff. So, [it’s about] getting 
them to a point where they become more independent’ (C1). However, a number of participants, 
especially the more high-ranking members of the IGT, also flagged reasons for optimism. There has 
been clear and sustained political ‘buy-in’ from Islington Council over this acute lack of life skills 
and the corresponding need for a long-term approach, and this buy-in remains central to the IGT’s 
capacity, ethos and effectiveness (C1).
4.3 Nature of gangs/groups and SYV in Islington
In characterising SYV in Islington, a number of police officers noted that it tends to be disorganised 
and opportunistic rather than patterned and carefully orchestrated. As one officer explained:
I don’t think much of it is that calculated.  I have seen some calculated stuff… but I think normally they gee 
each other up, they drift into the rival territory for whatever reason they might do, and they find someone 
to victimise.  And often the poor person they victimise is often a peripheral person or someone just sort of 
passing through, a youth from the area, because they sort of grab the first person they find. (A2)
This view was supported by a second officer who spoke of disorganised gangs, with some level of 
co-ordination and links to Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) but lacking a clear division of labour or 
hierarchy (A6).
For many IGT personnel, the nature of SYV and the criminal landscape of Islington more generally 
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is broadly similar to other London boroughs. Importantly, however, it is the local drug market that 
offers different opportunity structures (C1). The same interviewee also noted that Islington is small 
in relation to the level of neighbourhood crime recorded in the borough, and that this discrepancy 
is viewed as a problem by borough authorities (C2). The wide variety of criminal activity is definitely 
linked to organised crime, the participant added, before conceding, ‘we just don’t know where it’s 
linked’ (C2).
Participants also flagged differences with other London boroughs, particularly the demographic 
characteristics of Islington’s gangs (C1) and the age of the borough’s SYV nominals. Gangs are both 
younger and less organised in Islington than in neighbouring Camden, argued one police officer: 
‘In Islington there’s a lot of younger, I’d say, gang members, compared to Camden for instance. 
Camden seems a lot more organised, Islington has a lot of younger groups that carry knives as a 
common practice’ (A5). This was corroborated by a fellow officer, who added that gang members in 
Islington were more violent than their older counterparts in other boroughs, being less mindful of 
the consequences of their actions (A6). Another interviewee concurred, stating that offenders were 
getting younger – particularly for offences involving knives – with high reoffending rates a particular 
cause for concern (F1). One participant identified the borough’s youth crime problem with theft and 
acquisitive crime, rather than violent altercations between groups of young people (C4).
Other boroughs contained more established gangs and although participants alluded to historic 
criminality in certain parts of the borough, gang membership in Islington was consistently described 
by interviewees as ‘fluid’ and ‘messy’ (A1; A3; C4). This was due to fission and fusion in relation to 
gang membership and related forms of intra- and inter-group conflict (B1) and crime patterns that 
were routinely shifting (C1, C2). 
The geographical territories attributed to Islington’s seven officially designated gangs straddle 
borough boundaries, and one police officer confirmed that some groups ‘hang out’ in places 
located some distance from the ‘territory’ demarcated by police analysts or described by gang 
maps (G1). One of Working Together for a Safer Islington’s objectives is to ‘work to establish a wider 
London footprint to tackle gangs and county lines, recognising that young people do not recognise 
boundaries or borders’. 
In terms of young people exiting gang life, the routine pathways to desistance identified in the gang 
literature (Armstrong and Rosbrook-Thompson 2017; Pyrooz and Decker 2011) and summarised above 
are less in evidence because of the nature of the borough and its criminal opportunity structures. 
One participant spoke of a ‘revolving door’:
If there’s not that support, they become more disengaged from society and then they start to spiral, and I 
think they would just be coming in and out of prison in terms of criminality, whether that’s low-level crime 
or whether they go onto commit a serious offence. (C1)
Participants indicated that the familiar phenomenon of desistance via maturation does not apply 
in Islington. A police officer summarised this view, noting that in their experience gang nominals 
would be ‘lost for good’ if they hadn’t desisted from gang-related activity by their mid-twenties (A4). 
As well as pointing to a structural diagnosis of SYV, this apparent trend underlines the importance 
of early intervention (C1), with one participant highlighting Education, Training & Employment (ETE) 
as a particularly effective ‘maker’ of desistance (C4).
IGT members’ understanding of SYV in Islington in many places reflected their varied areas of 
expertise and different priorities in terms of addressing the challenges both faced by and created by 
young people with stagnating prospects in a period of austerity. The IGT was established precisely 
to engage better with complex sources of SYV in the borough and provide a more comprehensive 
approach to safeguarding, prevention and enforcement. It is to the creation of the IGT that we 
turn next. 
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5. Origins of the IGT
The Integrated Gangs Team (IGT) was formed in 2016. It brings together staff from Islington Council 
– including a Business Support Coordinator and Team Manager, four case workers, one Youth 
Offending Service (YOS) case worker, two Children’s Social Care (CSC) specialist gangs and Serious 
Youth Violence (SYV) social workers, and one gangs and Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) analyst – 
the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) – including Detective Sergeants and Detective Inspectors 
and 28 Police Constables and Detective Constables – the National Health Service (NHS) – including 
a dedicated Psychologically Informed Consultation and Training (PICT) practitioner – the social 
enterprise group, Abianda – including experts on gang-affected young women –  Victim Support, 
Probation (CSC case management and the National Probation Service), the Department for Work and 
Pensions (DWP), and the St Giles Trust. As a joint partnership aimed at combatting SYV, the IGT is 
part of Islington’s Youth Crime Strategy, elaborated in Working Together for a Safer Islington, and 
emerged in response to a spike in SYV across the borough in 2015. 
The IGT built on and extended the remit of the previously existing 18–24 team, itself formed in 
the aftermath of a high-profile murder trial that hinged on the legal doctrine of ‘joint enterprise’. 
Four young people were murdered in Islington in 2015, while increases in knife crime and robbery 
offences were recorded during the same year. Many victims and perpetrators were under 18. This 
apparent increase in local serious crime prompted an expansion of the borough’s gangs agenda. 
The IGT’s focus would be on young people aged between 10 and 24, and the approach would be 
defined by the principles of safeguarding and diversion as well as enforcement.
The formation of the IGT took place in a context of fiscal austerity and organisational restructuring. 
Well-publicised cuts in funding to the MPS had resulted in Borough Intelligence Units being 
centralised and scaled-back, while local authorities also faced the scaling down and privatisation 
of services. In these straitened conditions it made sense for organisations to work together, sharing 
information and pooling resources. There was also a wider call for information sharing and a 
diversification of tactics in the combatting of gangs and SYV. 
The riots of summer 2011 prompted a Home Office investigation into gang and youth violence. The 
subsequent report, Ending Gang and Youth Violence (2011), resulted in Operation Trident – up to 
this point responsible for investigating all non-fatal shootings in the capital – being repurposed 
into Trident Gang Crime Command, responsible for tackling gang crime more generally. The years 
following the riots would also see the creation of the MPS Gangs Matrix database. 
The riots highlighted the importance of information sharing, but the initial stimulus came earlier. 
In 2010 the Department for Children, Work and Families published Working Together to Safeguard 
Children. This report contained guidelines to inform inter-agency working around the safeguarding 
and promotion of children’s welfare, and objectives relating to young people at serious risk of harm 
from community-based violence such as gang, group and knife crime. These guidelines, together with 
a greater recognition among relevant agencies that the response to gang crime and the emergent 
phenomenon of county lines should focus on support around vulnerability and exploitation, rather 
than drug arrests, was a further driver of multi-agency work and information sharing. This approach 
was subsequently endorsed by the Modern Slavery Act of 2015, with its focus on forced labour, child 
exploitation and debt bondage, all of which had been identified with the operation of county lines 
in successive National Crime Agency (NCA) reports (NCA 2015, 2016, 2017). The connection between 
this new legislation and gangs was strengthened in July 2018, when the Home Office announced a 
review of the Modern Slavery Act in response to the ‘evolution’ of gangs.  
It is in this wider context of rising SYV, the promotion of multi-agency partnership working and 
information sharing, and a renewed national focus on child exploitation and vulnerability, that the 
IGT became part of Islington’s 2015 Youth Crime Strategy (subsequently built on by 2017’s Working 
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Together for a Safer Islington). The Youth Crime Strategy itself was a response to a spike in levels of 
SYV which temporarily brought Islington in line with high-SYV boroughs like Lambeth and Hackney. 
More specifically, the borough witnessed a 30% increase in SYV between 2014/15 and 2015/16, 
while the number of victims of knife crime under the age of 25 also increased by 9%. The principal 
sources of funding for the IGT are the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), Islington 
Council, and the MPS.
5.1 Existing models
In terms of its structure, procedures and ethos, the Islington IGT took inspiration from a number of 
existing models. The Hackney IGT, referred to by one interviewee as ‘the original ‘Rolls Royce’ (A4), 
was an important precedent, particularly in terms of the extent and nature of collaboration between 
local authority agencies and the police and the input of academic experts in gangs/SYV (from the 
University of Bedfordshire). Other existing models in Manchester, Haringey and Westminster were 
also examined, with one IGT member noting that ‘we took bits from everywhere we visited’ (C1).
As well as the government reports and legislation bearing on multi-agency collaboration and 
information sharing detailed above, the IGT’s partnership element also borrowed from Trident Gang 
Crime Command’s extended focus on ‘proactivity and education’ (A4), together with the work of 
existing gang units in Islington and elsewhere which similarly focused on proactivity, engagement and 
risk (A6). In organisational terms, the IGT subsumed the 18–24 team whose work, in the eyes of one 
interviewee, was not integrated enough, with insufficient information sharing and not enough focus 
on victimhood and gang-affected young females (C1), particularly given the proliferation of county 
lines and associated forms of exploitation (A1).
6. Rationale Underpinning the IGT
6.1 The role of safeguarding
All interviewees noted the centrality of safeguarding in the work of the IGT. Those leading and co-
ordinating the IGT spoke of safeguarding reconceptualising the work being undertaken, with risk 
and vulnerability being determined in order to formulate individualised safety plans for young 
people (C2). Team members also recognised, however, that when risk of SYV exceeded a certain 
level, enforcement would come to the fore and the police would assume a leading role (A3). In these 
circumstances, other members of the IGT work to ensure police officers have a good understanding 
of the wider context in which enforcement takes place. Indeed, the primacy of safeguarding was 
evident in the fact that the other two elements in the IGT’s three-tier approach (C1) – enforcement and 
intervention – were justified in terms of their relationship with safeguarding. One interviewee spoke 
of intervention being justified by the minimising of safeguarding risk (C1). Another noted that a lack 
of engagement with the IGT might prompt an enforcement-led intervention – and, ostensibly at least, 
the closing of a case – but that this intervention would create further opportunities for engagement 
and/or diversion geared to safeguarding (C2). While there was almost complete consensus regarding 
safeguarding as a first-order principle of the IGT’s work, there was less agreement around how best 
to operationalise this principle as IGT practice. As one participant described, ‘The concept of a 
solution I think is different. It looks differently to police than it does to us sometimes’ (A7).
Recommendations 
 Ethos: reinforce the IGT’s safeguarding ethos by routinely revisiting how it can be 
operationalised across the range of partners and activities that inform the team’s work. 
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6.2 An evolving approach in a dynamic environment 
Though the organising principles underpinning the IGT and its work are constant, the context within 
which these principles must be applied is dynamic and constantly shifting. The key contextual shift 
that the IGT faces is the fact that the individuals involved in SYV in Islington are getting younger. This 
shift was articulated by multiple participants, one of whom stated that the IGT’s central objective 
is to make sure young people don’t ‘graduate’ to Gangs Matrix status (C2). It reflects the priority 
objectives laid out in Working Together for a Safer Islington (2016: 13), which include a commitment 
to ‘broaden the scope of the Integrated Gangs Team to work with young people on the periphery 
of gangs as well as those who are established members’. To meet this commitment, the lower age 
limit of the target cohort was reduced from 18 to 10, underpinned by the realisation that, as one 
interviewee put it, ‘there’s a vacuum and that is always filled very quickly with the next generation 
coming up’ (C1). 
A diversification in the nature and methods of exploitation, particularly relating to children and 
young women, was also important in refining the IGT’s remit. More specifically, forms of grooming 
and child sexual exploitation, increasingly linked to county lines, necessitated the extension of the 
IGT’s age range (C2; C3), while a significant increase in the number of young women falling victim to 
SYV, together with stronger indications that the number of young women committing SYV was also 
increasing (PCC 2016) underlined the importance of focusing on females as well as males. On this 
point, female-focussed members of the IGT spoke of their determination to reframe discussions of 
gangs and young women and, in doing so, to address longstanding biases around this issue (B2). 
Another factor was shifting patterns in street crime, in accordance with  changes in demand for 
stolen goods (C2), and opaque links between moped crime, gangs and OCGs. As one police officer 
put it, ‘The same people who snatch also do the raids on high-brand shop windows in Bond Street – 
it all starts in Essex Road and Cally. They’re thieves really. But they know everyone who we are after 
as well’ (G1).
These emerging trends, the complex links between them, and the safeguarding, intervention and 
enforcement realities to which they gave rise, created challenges regarding the IGT’s remit and 
capabilities. For example, while intelligence across multiple areas (encompassing gangs, SYV, CSE, 
wider exploitation and county lines) had established a stronger evidential link between county lines 
networks and CSE than between gangs and CSE, it was unclear whether the IGT was equipped to take 
the right steps given the assumptions about gangs implicated in the Gangs Matrix and, relatedly, 
the composition of the IGT (A1). 
6.3 How the IGT works
IGT staff were unanimous in describing the IGT as a well-resourced group able to intervene swiftly 
and decisively in the interest of safeguarding young people by providing a ‘wraparound service’ (E1). 
One police officer drew on the psychological notion of a ‘gestalt’ – denoting something that is more 
than the sum of its parts – to characterise the efficiency and effectiveness of the IGT’s multi-agency 
work (A2).
Staff were also in agreement about the importance of extending the IGT’s target cohort, in line with its 
preventative strands of work, beyond the Gangs Matrix’s top 50 nominals to a wider group of ‘at-risk 
young people’ (C4), with the virtues of early intervention underlined by the majority of interviewees. 
The extension of IGT’s remit resulted in three cohorts (amounting to around 70 live cases at any given 
time [C1]): the Gangs Matrix top 50; young victims; and young women. This extended focus was also 
informed by IGT analysis which showed that most of the young people under 18 who experienced 
gang violence also experienced another form of exploitation (A7).
Young people joined one of the three cohorts once referred by a relevant agency and via a collective 
decision based on the characteristics of their case reaching a pre-determined threshold (the vast 
majority of those not accepted into one of the IGT cohorts are redirected into another channel of 
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intervention). In this way the IGT was envisaged as part of a bigger picture (D2) encompassing CSE, 
Missing Persons and gang-affected young women (EM –Interview 1).   
6.4 The diversification of methods
The extension of the IGT’s target cohort entailed a diversification of its methods and the settings in 
which interventions took place, with one participant talking of prison-based work, person-based 
work and family-based work (C4). One virtue of the emphasis on early intervention and prevention 
seems to be more efficient use of resources; early intervention is considered more targeted and less 
continuous than the statutory forms of intervention which may occur later (C2). There was lack of 
clarity among participants about the formal mechanisms required to exploit and develop the prime 
objective of early intervention.
This diversification of methods involved balancing enforcement and diversion (C2). In this context 
great store was set by building relationships with young people. For many participants, relationship-
building is fundamental because, due to their lack of statutory power, they must encourage young 
people to engage voluntarily (C2). Should these attempts at relationship-building with young people 
prove unsuccessful, focus can be redirected at family members and the ways in which they might be 
supported.
In the interests of building trust, some participants noted how the rationale for procedures relating 
to information sharing are explained to young people (C1). Similarly, one participant talked of 
emphasising the protective function of controversial measures such as stop and search, framing 
these as an integral part of public and individual safety practices (C2).
Participants also described the challenges they face in building relationships with disengaged young 
people. One participant described the ‘needs-based work’ which focuses not on how to replace 
the money acquired through SYV and/or gang-related activity, but instead on reframing the young 
person’s aspirations (C4). Another challenge is trying to working more effectively with services that 
have already ‘failed’ the young person (C4).
The fact that the IGT was drawn from a range professional backgrounds was described as an asset by 
all interviewees. Different styles of work allowed IGT personnel to learn from one another (C4), and 
pooling different forms of expertise meant the IGT was better able to recognise and assess what is 
changing, be more ‘proactive’, and develop a better understanding of the young people it is working 
with (C2). 
Participants reported having the space and resources – particularly within monthly ‘reflective 
practice’ exercises – to innovate and to a certain extent reshape their job description in the 
interests of greater effectiveness. For one participant, this means providing a weekly email of useful 
‘intelligence’ to a range of relevant workers. For another, the ability to determine ‘risk’ in a different 
manner from the police, which is better suited to early intervention work, is pivotal in a context where 
the police may define and interpret high risk differently from other statutory and non-statutory IGT 
partners. Other participants noted, however, that support for innovation was not always consistent, 
particularly where temporary managers might be concerned (B1). Also, while all interviewees noted 
the importance of the IGT as a hub, many pointed out that it is not the only relevant partnership 
concerning gangs and SYV (E1; E2). 
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7. What is Distinctive About the Islington IGT?
7.1 Co-location
In identifying what is distinctive about the Islington IGT, interviewees pointed to the size and 
composition of the team, as well as the benefits of co-location at Islington Police Station. One police 
officer noted that while in the case of other IGTs, a limited number of Gangs Officers would devote part 
of their post to IGT work, all 28 of Islington’s Gangs Officers are committed to the borough’s IGT (A2). 
The benefits of co-location are harnessed via daily tasking meetings, the importance of which was 
stressed by many participants. These meetings are not police-led, but informed by police updates – 
with police officers holding a separate meeting immediately prior to the IGT tasking meeting – and 
conversations around the Gangs Matrix. The majority of participants also liked the accountability 
afforded by co-location, with actions being assigned across the IGT and updates being provided, in 
some cases as quickly as the following day. In addition to the greater accountability that results from 
daily tasking meetings, the way actions are formulated as a team was also singled out for praise.
The benefits of co-location were manifest in some of the cases discussed by interviewees. One police 
officer described a situation in which a 13-year-old at serious risk of grooming and child slavery was 
located by police officers on the basis of information shared by other IGT members. This information 
included details of recent places of stay and other locations connected with possible county lines 
activity. After being taken into police protection and subsequently into the care of social services, 
the young person’s new address was provided to the police by a member of the IGT, and a strategy 
meeting concerning the young person’s safeguarding scheduled for the same afternoon. As the 
officer in question put it, ‘It (IGT co-location) just means that we are on the ball with exactly who’s 
gone where, and their safety, really’ (A5). As one participant summarised, ‘It (co-location) means 
that I would say we’re responding quicker than we ever were to risk, particularly acute risk’ (A7).
Recommendations 
Co-Location: maintain the principle of co-location as a defining characteristic of the Islington IGT. 
7.2 Number/range of members
The sheer variety in IGT membership was also described as an asset in itself, with one police officer 
claiming that Islington’s team is the only IGT in London to boast such variety (A3). This variety carries 
certain clear benefits from a policing point of view. As well as filling police intelligence gaps – ‘people 
don’t talk to us’, as one officer put it (A4) – some participants argued that discussions among IGT 
members offers important additional context that can inform police decision-making and activities. 
One participant described the kind of situation in which this additional context can be of benefit: 
‘So … when I’ve gone into custody and there’s a young person there, the police are like, “Oh,” about 
them and I have to say actually they witnessed dad beating the hell out of mum, that’s going to 
have an impact on them, or actually, you know… they have come from war-torn country and they’ve 
witnessed, you know, half their family being blown up, so what do you expect?’ (B3).
The contribution of particular IGT members was identified by some participants, while others focused 
on the combination of different kinds of expertise – the gestalt referred to earlier. One participant 
noted how having a psychologist on the IGT creates an enabling environment for young people (B1), 
while those who work with gang-affected young women underscored the importance of counselling 
and therapy sessions (B2). Others focused on proactively shifting the IGT’s focus to a younger cohort, 
with one participant describing compiling their own list of at-risk youngsters by ‘working back from 
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matrix’ (E1). This interface between experts and datasets also enhances efficiency: IGT members 
are able to provide training on key aspects of gangs and SYV across the borough, where before this 
work may have been outsourced to a third-party organisation (E1). As a result of these multiple and 
intersecting factors, one IGT member proposed that ‘our model is kind of like the Rolls Royce. If you 
think, every box is ticked and, you know, some of that’s luck because of who we had and the funding 
we already had in-place. But it’s kinda come together well’ (D2).
8. Usefulness/Necessity of the Concept of the ‘Gang’ for Different Areas of IGT Work
8.1 The ‘gang’
When it was first established, the IGT worked to the definition of gangs developed in the Centre for 
Social Justice report, Dying to Belong (2009: 26): ‘A relatively durable, predominantly street-based 
group of young people who (1) see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group, (2) 
engage in a range of criminal activity and violence, (3) identify with or lay claim over territory, (4) 
have some form of identifying structural feature, and (5) are in conflict with other, similar, gangs’. 
The Home Office Early intervention foundation (2015) confirmed that the UK government had adopted 
this definition. There is also a statutory definition of gang-related violence under the Serious Crime 
Action (2015): 
Section 34(5) of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 (updated by the Serious Crime Act 2015) defines 
gang-related violence as 
‘Violence or a threat of violence which occurs in the course of, or is otherwise related to, the activities 
of a group that:
a) consists of at least 3 people; and,
b) has one or more characteristics that enable its members to be identified by others as a group.”
Section 34(5) of the 2009 Act (updated by the Serious Crime Act 2015) defines gang-related drug 
dealing activity as:
‘the unlawful production, supply, importation or exportation of a controlled drug which occurs in the 
course of, or is otherwise related to, the activities of a group that
a) consists of at least 3 people; and,
b) has one or more characteristics that enable its members to be identified by others as a group
Awareness of and adherence to these official definitions varied across the IGT, and many participants 
held their own views both on what constitutes a gang and on the usefulness of the term more 
generally. This diversity of views is unsurprising given the lack of research consensus on these 
matters. Opinions ranged from support, to qualified support, to explicit resistance. Those in favour 
of the term contended that as ‘gangs’ are ‘not going anywhere’, the label remains important (E2). 
Similarly, one police participant argued that the ‘gang’ label reflects the territorial attachments of, 
and tit-for-tat violence between, criminal groups, and that although young people may reject gang 
labels when confronted by police, they tend to self-identify with gang collectives when using social 
media (A5).
Other participants called for a more thoughtful and principled use of the term. One police officer 
noted that the term is useful for identifying collectives and keeping certain of them apart – and is 
particularly justified for the borough’s ‘well-established gangs’. However, they also stressed that 
misapplication of the term can hinder understanding of intra-group and disorganised violence, 
noting that ‘some of the more recent murders and significant incidents have been internal disputes 
within what we believe to be all part of the same gang’ (A3).
17
For some participants, what set gangs apart is their violence, with criminal groups being identified 
more with organised crime. Multi-agency consensus is key here. Graduation to gang status must 
be agreed by a set of key partners, emphasising that ‘you can’t make that decision on your own’ 
(A1). The issues of violence and labelling came together in the account of one police officer, who 
complained that the term ‘gang’ is being misapplied to young people amid a fluid gang landscape 
where entrenched gang ‘elders’ seldom came to the attention of authorities. This is because of 
the delegation of violence to youngers, who become labelled and targeted disproportionately in 
relation to their level of gang involvement (A5).  
A similar ambivalence and desire for greater clarity on the term ‘gang’ and cognate labels was 
articulated by the Home Office in 2012 when it underlined the importance of defining and mapping 
‘gangs’ and ‘groups’ and, more specifically, identifying the links between delinquent peer groups, 
urban street gangs and organised crime groups.
Other IGT members were more critical of the term ‘gang’, referring to the self-fulfilling nature of gang 
rhetoric. One participant argued that it was the ability to apply and validate the term that was important, 
stating: ‘I think where it matters is not necessarily amongst young people themselves, but people who 
have the power to label’ (C3). This view was echoed by another participant (C1), who contended that 
‘gang’ was a label used more by authorities than young people themselves and that young people tend 
to deny gang affiliation – an assertion supported by multiple police officers. The difficulty of dispensing 
with gang talk altogether was evident in the fact that even those participants who bemoaned the term 
and its usage elsewhere spoke of ‘gang culture’ existing among young people. 
Inconsistencies were also evident in the definition of gangs. Islington’s Safeguarding Children 
Affected by Gang Activity and/or Gang-Related Serious Youth Violence: Multi-agency Protocol and 
Practice Guidance (2016: 7) includes a definition from gang scholars Hallsworth and Young (2004), 
while one interviewee’s description of gangs approximated to Thrasher’s (1927) classic definition of 
gangs as groups ‘integrated through conflict’ (A1).
Some IGT members disavowed the term ‘gang’ when explaining their work to young people in order to 
pre-empt what was described as the, ‘I’m not in a gang, I don’t need a gang worker’ response (C3). It 
should be noted, however, that for other members of the team the label could be more empowering. 
As the IGT member described, ‘I think the big advantage is our name, we’re the gangs team, it’s one 
of those that when you throw that in there with housing or with the benefit office, in any service, they 
maybe take you a bit more seriously’ (B4).
Given the widening scope of IGT activity, the ambivalence of many participants toward the term 
‘gang’, and the fact that since 2011–12 the MPS has classified a relatively small proportion of SYV as 
gang-related, it might be time to review the name of the IGT.
Recommendations 
Name: consider whether the IGT’s name still adequately reflects the range of activities and 
cohorts with which it engages, given the controversies attached to the term ‘gang’. 
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8.2 The Gangs Matrix
All interviewees were asked about the use of the Gangs Matrix and invited to reflect on the criticism 
the database received from the charity Amnesty International. The Matrix itself was developed as part 
of the aforementioned Ending Gangs and Youth Violence strategy of 2011. It places gang nominals 
into red, amber and green categories based on intelligence concerning violence, with all nominals 
ranked according to risk and harm scores. The Matrix includes three cohorts – perpetrators, victims 
and those in custody – and it is possible to appear in more than one cohort. Participants in this 
study noted that the Islington Gangs Matrix contains between 150 and 160 names, of whom around 
50 are in prison (A1). 
A number of IGT members mounted a strident defence of the Gangs Matrix in relation to allegations 
contained in the Amnesty report. Most made the case that the database was not designed for public 
perusal or scrutiny, and that it performs a monitoring rather than an operational function (B3). 
Others argued that the Matrix is not the sole source of intelligence and information used by the 
IGT; it is cross-referenced with other lists (including social services and CSE lists) and indicators 
(A3; D1; D2). One IGT member noted how the Matrix was used alongside other information sources 
to identify young people for ‘victim empathy’ work, and that only 50% of the people worked with 
by IGT Victim Support appear on the Matrix. The Matrix could be used in similarly indirect ways to 
target the potentially vulnerable and ‘at-risk’ partners of ‘red’ gang nominals. As one participant 
explained, ‘the use it has to me is to be identifying the girlfriends of those guys’ (B2). The possibility 
of appearing on different Matrix cohorts as well as the risk-related lists of other agencies means that 
young people can be subject to different kinds of intervention concurrently (C1).
Where the IGT’s ‘Top 50’ cohort are concerned, the Matrix plays a more significant role. The entire 
top 50 on the Islington Gangs Matrix is allocated a case worker, with IGT work being key for nominals 
over the age of 18 – as is the case for the majority of the top 50 – who receive very little statutory 
support. As one police officer put it, for top 50 nominals the IGT’s services thus represent a ‘huge 
uplift’ in available support (A2). 
The same officer noted that the Matrix provides a means of weighing the most violent and at-risk 
cases against levels of engagement with the IGT and any other support services. For example, an 
individual may be on the Matrix for a long time because of committing a serious violent offence, but 
because of their engagement with the IGT be considered less of a priority than someone with the 
same score who is not engaging, and for whom prison may be only remaining option (A2). Another 
participant was less positive about the Matrix and targeting its top 50 nominals. Here the issue was 
the mixing of absolute (red, amber, green) and relative (target the top 50) measures: ‘The pitfall is 
that if you are number one, you stay number one until someone relieves you, goes above you’ (E2).  
Some participants defended the Matrix on practical grounds. As one put it: ‘I think if we’re working 
with the Gangs Unit, the police unit, we will always have to… work around the risk assessment tool 
that they use, and if that’s the matrix, that’s the matrix’ (A7).
Others admitted confusion concerning the intelligence on which the Matrix is based and the algorithm 
that processes this information, but reasoned that ranked cohort lists seem to correspond with an 
anecdotal assessment of key players and are useful for case selection (A5). More specifically, one 
police officer accepted that there can be informational anomalies, but proposed that the Matrix 
is more accurate ‘the higher you go’ (A6). Concerns related to the risk of an ‘expert’, neutral gloss 
being given to unintentional bias and subjective judgement. This concern is important given that 
the balance between enforcement and diversion is determined partly by where someone sits on the 
Matrix. As one participant explained, there is:
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… almost a zero-tolerance approach to those [red] individuals. So, if they’re seen on the streets they’re 
stopped and searched. If they’re caught with cannabis it’s not, “Okay, we’ll give you a warning,” they’re 
arrested for it.1 Then, I think it’s a balance… across the IGT.  So, from the police perspective, if they’ve got 
intel that they’re dealing drugs or that they’re involved in any criminal activity, they’ll continue with their 
enforcement angle on that, but they will also be aware that we are engaging with them and around whether 
they’re positively engaging or not, because we share that at tasking all the time and at our more strategic 
meetings, etc.  So, I suppose there is that balance. (C2)
The Matrix is also influential in the way it interfaces with other risk assessment instruments. The CSE 
risk assessment provides one example. As one participant explained: ‘Level two is where someone 
has been injured as part of gang activity... they might have been attacked or you know, run over or 
stabbed. And then Level three is really entrenched, that you’re on the gang’s matrix’ (E1). The Matrix’s 
RAG ratings and the ways in which they are determined are therefore implicated in other forms of 
assessment, and as such shape outcomes outside the immediate purview of the Matrix itself.
Though many IGT members accepted that the Gangs Matrix is an imperfect tool used in a selective, 
intelligent manner, more substantial conceptual and operational concerns were also raised during 
interviews. Several participants noted that the Matrix was largely unhelpful for tracking drug 
offences, including county lines activity, if these did not involve violent acts. This view was not shared 
by all participants, however, with one participant proposing that county lines (and drug dealing 
more generally) is not necessarily a gang issue at all (A1). A related concern was that, by prioritising 
violence, the Matrix is skewed in the direction of gang ‘youngers’; several participants made the 
point – which finds support in the gangs research literature (Densely 2014) – that gang evolution 
tends to see ‘elders’ engage in less violence, and hence feature less prominently on the Gangs 
Matrix (A1; D3; E1). Indeed, one police officer suggested that it be rebranded as the Serious Youth 
Violence Matrix (A4). Thus, while the focus on high-risk cases (F1) was justified in terms of minimising 
short-term risk, other people implicated in violent acts, though they may be more entrenched in 
gang activity, would not be targeted by the IGT. Likewise, for those agencies concerned with early 
intervention, a young person’s appearance on the Matrix would suggest the optimal moment for 
intervention had already passed. 
One IGT member highlighted the issue of sexual violence: ‘Madness, madness.  How can we say 
that this member of a gang, or whatever, is not more violent, when they’ve committed multiple gang 
rapes? I just find that mad’ (A7).2 For another participant, the very categorization of youth offenders 
into ‘High’, ‘Medium’ or ‘Low’ Risk groups was described as ‘not viable’ on the grounds that it was 
too general (F2).
Definitional issues also related to moped crime and, more specifically, the question of whether 
groups committing theft while riding mopeds constituted gangs. A spike in the number of moped 
‘gangs’ was noted by a number of interviewees (C2; D2), but other participants explained that these 
so-called ‘snatch nominals’ were being targeted by a different team (A1). One participant noted that, 
if groups of non-violent ‘snatch nominals’, a ‘high proportion’ of which comprise ‘working-class 
white boys’, do not qualify as gangs (as far as the Gangs Matrix and IGT are concerned), institutional 
norms may be reproducing racialised notions of crime – that is, reinforcing a damaging stereotype 
of gangs as black and violent vs. acquisitive criminal groups as white and non-violent (C3).3
1 The MPS team responsible for the central administration of the Gangs Matrix queried this comment, noting that simply being on the matrix 
or a red nominal is not sufficient justification to stop. MPS policy dictates that there must be grounds at the time for a search to take place. 
2 The MPS team responsible for the central administration of the Gangs Matrix noted that all sexual offences are scored on the 
database. Rape is one of the highest scoring offences, on a par with GBH Wounding, which includes stabbings. More than one rape 
results in classification as a high amber nominal (without any other scoring) and three rapes results in classification as a red nominal. 
3 The MPS team responsible for the central administration of the Gangs Matrix noted that robbery, weapons or violence on moped 
attract scoring on the Matrix, but theft snatches and dipping (pickpocketing) do not because the Matrix has always been focused 
on violence. 
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The ethno-racial composition of the MPS Matrix featured heavily in the Amnesty report. The ethno-
racial composition of the Islington Gangs Matrix was discussed by a number of participants. There 
was disagreement here, with one participant (A2) noting that the Black and Minority Ethnic (BaME) 
composition of the MPS Gangs Matrix is reflected in Islington, while another stated that there are more 
white offenders and victims of SYV in Islington and hence on the Islington Matrix (A3). One IGT member 
expressed their discomfort with the racial composition of the Matrix together with the implication 
that ‘society is safe … (as) it’s just black people or people from black and ethnic communities that 
are stabbing each other’ (B3). The concern is that the structural-cultural effect of the Matrix might 
be to distance and obfuscate: dealing in abstracts such as ‘red’ and ‘amber’ nominals glosses over 
distinctive individual characteristics and circumstances, while the perception that the majority of 
these nominals are non-white makes risk and harm the preserve of local BaME communities. 
The Matrix has been criticised not just around information sharing and data protection (ICO 2018), 
but also for the possibility of an algorithmically-driven database being used to code common-sense 
assumptions about gang and gang-related activity in supposedly neutral and objective terms. The 
recent lawsuit filed against the Boston Police Department on the basis of its points-system and 
compiling of ‘gang packets’ might sound a note of caution here (Bentancourt 2018). 
A parallel between the Boston case and the generation of Matrix-related intelligence is the monitoring 
of drill music videos uploaded to social media sites like YouTube. Participants noted that these 
videos are monitored for inflammatory material, as well as ‘who’s got their face out there’ (E2), and 
the determination of gang affiliation (A6). The mainstreaming of drill music – the genre has grown 
significantly in terms of both consumption and production in the last two years (Adegoke 2018) – has 
obvious implications for this kind of monitoring activity. With more young people seeking to mimic 
the branding and presentational orthodoxies of drill collectives/’gangs’ (Dymoke 2017), using this 
material to identify gangs and gang membership and, on a more basic level, the identification of this 
genre with gang activity itself, becomes problematic. 
The Gangs Matrix is a police-led tool that is used differently across different police areas, and it 
became clear from the interviews that it is viewed as most problematic by non-police partners. There 
were also identifiable differences between more and less senior members of the IGT relating to 
perceptions of the role and use of the Gangs Matrix. It is significant, given its controversy, that as 
the IGT has evolved and its scope expanded, its use of the Gangs Matrix has diminished. 
Based on concerns raised in the Amnesty International, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) 
began an investigation in October 2017 which found that that inconsistency in the use of the Matrix 
across London’s 32 Boroughs had resulted in multiple and serious breaches of data protection laws. 
The ICO issued an Enforcement Notice in late 2018, requiring the MPS to make necessary changes 
within six months. The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) undertook a thorough review of 
the Gangs Matrix, which was published in December 2018 (MOPAC, 2018). The review recommended ‘a 
comprehensive overhaul of the Matrix Operating Model both to restore trust in the Matrix and also to 
bring it into line with data protection legislation’, to be completed by December 2019. While it stressed 
the importance of the database for reducing violent crime, the review also flagged the disproportionate 
representation of young black males, the lack of community trust in the Matrix, and widespread 
misunderstanding among non-police practitioners around the aims and purpose of the Matrix. 
Recommendations 
Data Sources: re-examine the role and use of the Gang’s Matrix and its interaction with other 
databases in the work of the IGT.
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9. Areas of Consensus Around Tackling SYV in Islington
9.1 Timeframe
There were many areas of consensus among the IGT members interviewed, one of which concerned the 
timeframe of IGT impact. Despite the shared imperative to reduce short-term risks, members agreed 
that outcomes should be measured on multiple levels that also include the medium-to-long-term.  
9.2 Co-location
There was a clear consensus around the multiple benefits of co-location. One such benefit is clarity 
and accountability around tasking (E1). For one police officer, this means accountability is ‘built in’ 
to IGT procedures: ‘what happens downstairs is something’s given to someone, in the hand, and 
they take it there and then and they are all coming back the next day and they’re reporting back on 
it, so there’s a lot of accountability around it’ (A3).
The co-presence of experts also means delivers added value for respective services and agencies. 
Speaking about the safeguarding of gang-affected young women, participants highlighted the access 
to services, including location-specific databases, that otherwise wouldn’t be available (B1, B3). For 
another participant, this sharing of space and information enables more accurate estimates of risk 
(E1), while police officers not only benefit directly from other IGT members’ trusting relationships 
with young people (A3), but also see young people develop a better understanding of the benefits of 
working with police (at one remove) as a result. Another participant explained:
Well, now they’re like, “OK, so we know you’re not a police officer, but you’re well in there with the police, 
aren’t you?” Yeah … But that’s OK because that means when you get in trouble, we can act, these things 
happen. So I am really clear with them about… all the different professions I work with and why (B2). 
10. Areas of Disagreement or Confusion
When asked about the most challenging aspects of their work and the obstacles they face, IGT 
members identified a number of areas. These broadly relate to institutional tensions, communication 
and information sharing, (non-)statutory powers, remit, and resources.  
10.1 Partnership working: institutional tensions
The most obvious institutional tensions related to possible disconnects between an individual’s role within 
the IGT and the wider institutional culture and priorities of their direct employer. As one participant, ‘I don’t 
really have anything to do with my employer, it’s kind of a weird post that, although I’m paid by them, they 
don’t actually have anything to do with my role really’ (B3). Non-police participants also identified some 
aspects of ‘police culture’ that jarred with the IGT’s mission, at least during the Team’s early days. Participants 
reported that building trust between police and non-police members was challenging during this period, but 
that within six months positive relationships had been cemented and were working well (C1). The trust which 
was a prerequisite of effective information sharing required a change in mind-sets across the IGT. As one 
participant explained: 
…youth workers, the street youth workers, in the same way as the police were quite protective … so are 
the street youth workers in particular, because it’s primary that they knowledge share. So, it wasn’t just a 
one-way process in terms of the police not sharing (C1).
Interviewees reported that once mindsets had been adapted, a ‘conversations overcome everything’ 
ethos spread across the IGT (D2). Furthermore, co-location facilitated the building of trust through 
more informal information sharing (D2). 
Police participants also reported that trusting relationships took time to develop. One officer 
explained that, even in the context of information sharing and the collaborative management of 
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risk and responsibility, the police still ‘owned’ the risk that passed through the IGT (A3). A lingering 
sense of institutional territoriality and priority also seemed to influence communication flows and 
decision-making in the IGT’s early days. As one participant recalled: 
So, it wasn’t that we moved in and everything was hunky dory. There was a lot of information sharing. We 
were moving into the police’s space and obviously there’s a lot of confidential information discussed. So, 
that took quite a long time in terms of having a real cultural shifting in how we worked and who we worked 
with and that was from both sides. (C2)
Inter-agency dynamics have also caused some frustration and/or confusion, often surrounding 
incompatible timeframes and, by extension, differing perceptions of urgency and prioritisation. One 
participant described a lack of understanding on the part of some IGT colleagues regarding the time-
consuming nature of network analysis (A1), with another highlighting issues which resulted from 
members ‘not moving at the same pace’ (E1). The origin of these issues in institutional procedures 
and protocols was demonstrated in the case of missing persons. As one IGT member explained:
With social care, we have a protocol to follow, we have a missing [person] protocol… and it doesn’t always 
fit with the way the Police’s protocol is… So it is a lot of the time we are... we do spend a lot of time trying 
to get updates from Police. Sometimes it will overlap with gangs, we’ve got a young person who’s been 
missing for about two months (E1). 
Tension can also arise in the case of agency workers outside of the IGT being asked to refer a young 
person. One participant explained that any delay or obstruction here could affect not only IGT 
dynamics but also influence the young person in question (C2). Conversely, there is also a need to 
guard against the perception that once a case is taken on by the IGT, the buck has effectively been 
passed and the sending agency can close the case (C1).
Other issues concerned particular agencies, foremost among which were CSC case management 
and the Probation Service. We should stress that all participants set their remarks about probation 
services in the context of the funding cuts and restructuring. Also, several participants noted that 
it was the relatively smooth information sharing taking place elsewhere within the IGT that threw 
the comparably cumbersome and under-resourced processes of probation agencies into relief. One 
participant explained:
Looking at probation. So, information sharing with probation, and I think you’re aware of the split between 
probation and the [CYPS], and I think there’re under huge amounts of pressure in terms of caseloads, risk, 
etc. and particularly for our cohort of individuals who are high risk on the Matrix that we’re working with. 
Somehow information sharing, because they’re not … probation are not co-located with us, so that’s a real 
challenge for us (C1).
Numerous participants flagged the importance of the probation service for the IGT’s work, and their 
declining role within the team, as a result of diminishing resources in a context of privatisation and 
austerity, was a source of widespread concern. The comparative disembeddedness of probation 
represents a blockage in the IGT’s information sharing, meaning relevant information pertaining 
to high-risk individuals can be missed. A police officer put it as follows: ‘before we had someone 
who... knew all the probation officers and was able to get hold of them and stuff, or able to find 
out information about licences and all those sorts of things which are quite important’ (D1). One 
participant described the post-restructuring working conditions faced by probation workers as ‘very 
challenging’, with caseloads as high 60 and rising rates of repeat offending damaging staff morale 
(F2). This, it was suggested, contributed to a lack of joined-up action in IGT ouput.
Housing agencies were also identified as important to the work of the IGT but, due to limited 
engagement with the team, potential sources of delay and confusion. As with probation services, 
interviewees were keen to stress that it was housing procedures, rather than personnel, that could 
be problematic. As one IGT member explained, ‘because I’ve got such a high caseload of cases 
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where they do need imminent housing support, it’s like… if they’ve got any arrears or anything like 
that, it really slows the process down. So I think that’s a definite barrier’ (B4). Another participant 
described how a housing representative would attend only one monthly meeting (D1), a frustrating 
lack of presence given the importance of housing in effecting change. And another noted:
… what we know is that if we don’t support young people and families into stable and secure and safe 
places, then we can’t do any meaningful work. So, we need to look at basic needs before we even touch on 
looking at their thinking or behaviour and challenging their cognitive thinking. So, we need to go back to 
basics, and also housing is a huge achievement (C1).  
A housing strength is that Islington is one of the London authorities that has a reciprocal housing 
arrangement in place for young people and families who need moving from Islington to another 
area because of SYV and/or gang-related issues. There is also an assessment procedure for families 
from other boroughs who require rehousing support in Islington. This does not mean that every 
request for rehousing will be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the process is beneficial to the IGT because of 
the complexity and high need of some of the cases it must manage. 
10.2 Communication/Information sharing
As already noted, while IGT members were unanimous in their prioritisation of safeguarding, 
there was less agreement on the most effective way to go about safeguarding young people in 
difference contexts and circumstances. Issues surrounding communication and information sharing 
largely concerned limits on what could be shared between agencies and practical challenges to 
collaboration. Several participants explained that information sharing within the IGT is not, and 
cannot be, limitless. In many cases agencies have to weigh concerns relating to confidentiality 
against the obligation to share information with partner agencies (A5; B1; B4; C1). Importantly, 
blockages in information sharing can lead to duplication, as explained by one participant:  
So, like, everything from their name, the amount of times they see them per week, stuff like that, they can’t 
disclose to anybody. It’s like literally unless you work with that young person, that’s the only way you’re 
going to know that these guys are even working with them. And, you know, I understand why they have to 
do that because obviously their kind of work, was, I think it was on a trial kind of basis, I think it was partly 
funded by the NHS, but it’s like, you know, when you’ve got that sort of thing going on, you can’t really get 
any intel. It makes it really difficult for you to kind of really do anything meaningful with the young person. 
You don’t know whether you’re duplicating work and that sort of thing, yeah (B4). 
Participants also flagged the possibility that a certain agency may withhold information that 
contradicted other IGT sources, which could generate tension (A5). With many IGT workers explaining 
the principles of information sharing to young people, there was always the possibility that some 
individuals will similarly withhold information (B1). 
An enduring set of challenges around perceived lack of communication, intelligence gathering and the 
physical layout of workplaces was also described. Though the possibility of receiving live data via an 
online application was mooted by one participant, they complained about the time-lapse between a 
critical incident taking place and intelligence being elicited. Another frequently cited problem was the 
uneven nature of intelligence sources (C2), with this issue being particularly acute when it came to the 
structure of local gangs (A1). A lack of communication from police over big initiatives like Trident and 
operations relating to organised crime was also highlighted, with one participant stating:
… there could be a big operation going on up here that we won’t necessarily know about, and so it’s 
happened and then … and like Trident, you know Trident were coming into the borough to do some 
operations? The gangs unit would probably be aware that it’s happening, but won’t know the details of it 
until it’s happened (C2). 
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Although co-location afforded many benefits with regard to information sharing, the sharing of 
physical space could complicate the dissemination of sensitive information (A5). Another practical 
issue was possible turnover in IGT personnel. Even if the composition of the IGT remained constant 
in terms of the agencies represented, significant ‘catch up’ was required should any personnel 
changes occur. Unfortunately, these changes, particularly in relation to the police, were more likely 
in a transient and austere financial climate, as described by one participant: ‘given the huge, huge 
changes in the Met…  it’s so transient at the moment with police officers, they come and go so, 
so quickly’ (A7). The kind of comprehensive, tailor-made ‘safety plans’ and strategic intelligence 
envisaged by another participant would only be possible once these obstacles to information 
sharing had been removed (C4).
Recommendations 
Information Sharing: clarify the agency-specific and legal constraints around information 
sharing within the IGT and between Boroughs to address perceived asymmetries. 
10.3 Statutory vs. non-statutory powers
Many participants discussed the uneven spread of statutory powers within the IGT, with only the 
police, probation and social workers possessing these. The asymmetry between probation and 
other members of the IGT on this issue was a particular concern for one Team member: 
‘I think because they’re a statutory service and they work with the over 18s at certain points. So, if they 
want to call a professionals meeting, they call it. We can’t call it, because we’re not statutory. So, it’s all 
managed like that’ (C1).
An IGT colleague described the difficulty of harmonising their own statutory responsibilities and 
powers with the services provided by other IGT members:
… we make that referral decision on an individual basis of who that young person is and often, you know, 
they have got excellent relationships with IGT workers… And we would say, “Do you know what, social 
care, you take a sort of back seat in this role, you maybe focus on the mum’s issues with housing or benefit 
problems or the younger ones in the home and [the IGT workers] will do that bit of work”. But it’s managing 
lots of highly intelligent, highly skilled practitioners that all want to [help], you know, and it’s managing 
it in a way that’s right for the young person. Yeah, sometimes the young person can get lost in that (E1). 
The absence of statutory powers wasn’t understood as a shortcoming in the eyes of some IGT 
members. One opined that young people are more likely to opt-in if there are no sanctions or 
penalties attached to their non-engagement (C3). Others felt that such sanctions are needed:
I mean, the kids, they have to agree to see you, or the parents have to agree… They don’t have to see me, 
so sometimes [the key challenge] is getting them to agree to see me, or their parents to agree for me to see 
the young people (B3). 
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10.4 Remit
Concerns about the IGT’s remit were linked to the composition of the Team, how this shapes its 
overall mission, and how equipped members feel they are for early intervention. Other challenges 
related to the division of labour across the IGT as well as the combination of tasks included in agency 
workloads. 
Some participants described how over-professionalization and ‘too much specialisation’ adversely 
affected the IGT’s work, particularly during the Team’s early days. As a police officer explained: ‘I 
think it’s probably … it’s too specialist and it’s coming to the kids too late’ (A2). 
Some remit-related issues impact on services and resources. One participant explained that while 
very good links exist within the Team itself, elements of the IGT’s remit that overlap with other multi-
agency teams can lead to a short-term depletion of resources: ‘If the young person is linked to county 
lines, we’ll get less of that service because… you know, ICT is co-located here but the drug supply 
doesn’t encompass it, it doesn’t feature as much’ (A1). The spreading of county lines across the 
remits of various teams was identified as an important matter in itself, particularly given that these 
drug lines are a priority objective in Islington’s Youth Crime Strategy. A related issue was the need 
for cases involving missing persons connected to county lines to be treated as a safeguarding issue, 
with one participant noting: ‘we still need to work to a place where we take county lines missing 
young people as a safeguarding matter rather than their own choice to go off and run drugs if you 
like’ (E1). A more basic question over the IGT’s division of labour concerned the perception that the 
Team’s police contingent ‘does enforcement’ and the partnership ‘does safeguarding’. As one police 
officer described:
So it’s more from an enforcement viewpoint I see it, and at strategy meetings where you all go along to, 
it’s definitely more about safeguarding, I think, which is good, because I think that is where as police we 
don’t get too involved. We’re more trying to focus on the criminality aspect and going in and dealing with 
the offences (A5). 
The same officer explained the difficulty of police officers combining safeguarding with enforcement, 
and mooted the possibility of ‘keeping our unit completely separate from safeguarding and having a 
‘safeguarding young people’ gangs unit that goes on the social worker visits, that does those things. 
Because I think they find that difficult, and we find that difficult as well’ (A5). As one participant 
explained, the combination of these functions could also be confusing for young people, with the 
advice given to offenders arising from the division between ‘an enforcement perspective’ and ‘a 
rehabilitation perspective’ being perceived as ‘mixed messages’.
10.5 Resources
Participants also described the difficulties of working in a context of austerity and an uncertain 
funding environment. The fact that IGT funding is drawn from a number of sources – with funding 
for different posts necessarily coming from different places – generates a degree of volatility and 
uncertainty. While one participant emphasised that ‘lots of resource has gone into IGT’ (D2) and that 
funding was protected until 2020 (C1), another spoke of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’ (D3). Furthermore, 
a police officer described how the principle of ‘additionality’ underpins the Team’s multi-agency 
approach, but also presents challenges regarding funding:
Those roles didn’t exist before… you know, the Social Worker sat in the IGT – that’s not a role that exists 
somewhere else, that is the IGT Social Worker. Same for Mental Health, same for YOS, same for third sector. 
So, it costs all those people’s salaries and it costs the space (A2). 
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One participant stressed that, although current levels of trust and information sharing are 
high, they are dependent on all agencies being properly staffed and resourced (B1). For this IGT 
member, resentment among (remaining) probation staff directed at the well-resourced IGT could 
be problematic: ‘I think there’s been a general thing, we have, we have the time and the resources 
to support these young people and they don’t, and I think there’s a bit of resentment maybe, a 
little bit’ (B1). The restructuring of Community Safety, changes in leadership within Islington, and 
funding cuts faced by agencies outside the IGT have made the Team’s work harder. One participant 
explained that funding cuts tend to create shortcomings in universal services around the detection 
of special educational needs, drug addiction and mental health issues (B2).
The relationship between mental health, diagnostic thresholds and available provision was a 
particular concern for another participant, who noted that most gang-affected young people who 
have mental health issues do not meet the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services threshold. 
As a result: “They kind of fall into the middle ground that they don’t meet CAMHS threshold, they’re 
not obviously completely fine, they’re in the middle and there is nothing for them” (B3). This point 
should be considered in the context of the borough having a higher diagnosable mental health 
disorder rate (14% of 5 to 16-year olds) than the national average (Camden and Islington Public 
Health Report 2015). 
11. What Success Looks Like
11.1 Describing success
The IGT’s challenges with respect to the measurement of outcomes were neatly summarised by one 
participant: ‘I would say something I know that we’re trying really hard to do at the moment is, now 
the IGT is up-and-running, and has been for a while, is evidencing outcomes.  And a huge piece of 
work is evidencing outcomes, evaluation’ (A7). For a police officer, the prospect of adopting a public 
health approach to SYV was attractive primarily because of the long-term outlook it afforded:
… we don’t traditionally work in long-term timeframes in this country. So clearly, politically and also within 
the police, people work in relatively short posting periods or election runs or whatever, so that’s the longer 
term. We’re all talking about the public health approach at the moment, which is the long, long term. Great. 
Someone can actually really demonstrate what the public health approach is (A4). 
Given that substantive outcomes often cannot be evidenced for some time, immediate measures 
of success are modest and relative. As another police officer described, ‘to get someone like that 
just doing one thing, just going to a meeting once a week – that’s actually a big win’ (A2). For one 
participant, success must be viewed in relative terms: ‘we try and measure small steps as well as 
the stats’ (C1). This view was supported by another of the Team’s police officers, who argued that 
notions of success needed to take the magnitude of the challenge into account (A6). In practical 
terms, it is unlikely that a young person’s rehabilitation will be linear (C2). 
IGT members tended to define success according to their individual or agency’s brief. For some 
participants, statistics cannot be relied upon to capture success; case studies are needed to 
convey the qualitative side of a positive outcome (C1; C2). For those working with gang-affected 
young women, success involves building trust and brokering relationships with others in a 
position to help (B2), while for others success means generating high quality information, and 
does not necessarily concern how that information is acted on by partners (A1).
11.2 Quantifying success
Not all measures of success are qualitative. The IGT’s quarterly reports include measures of the 
Team’s performance against the Islington Youth and Community Service’s 12 objectives (labelled 
‘A’ to ‘L’). In 2017/18 the Team enjoyed considerable effectiveness across many of these stated 
objectives, with measured outcomes including:
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- A 67% reduction in cohort arrest rates (arrests per person);
- A 5% reduction in the proportion of the cohort arrested;
- A 67% reduction in MPS Gangs Matrix Harm Score (since referral date) for individuals exiting the IGT;
-  An 8.5% reduction in the number of knife crime with injury offences in Islington where the victim 
was aged between 1 and 24 and excluding domestic abuse (versus an increase of 2.9% across 
London).
-  Twenty-nine members of the cohort were supported into Education, Training or Employment (ETE); and
- Forty-three members of the cohort were supported to access safe and stable accommodation.
By comparison, the number of young people/young adults who underwent mental health assessment 
– just seven of the cohort – was disappointing, though partly explained by the absence of the Team’s 
psychologist between April 2017 and January 2018 (see also section 12.1 below) and the reluctance 
of some service users to engage in such a service.    
Furthermore, a number of the Team’s objectives are notable given the issues raised elsewhere in 
the report. Objective C), to ‘Reduce young people’s involvement in gangs/Reduce MPS Gang matrix 
risk level of individuals in scope’, invites the IGT to measure success in terms of the number of 
young people (still) listed on the Gangs Matrix and a reduction in nominals’ harm scores. This 
objective further embeds the Gangs Matrix in the work of the IGT and makes questions over its 
operationalisation and interaction with other data sources more pressing. Some IGT members 
queried its appropriateness as a measure of success. As one participant noted: ‘for me it’s not about 
the Matrix, it’s not about going from red, amber, green, to the next level down – so the next level 
down to being off the matrix.  That is only one indicator of positive outcome’ (A7). Objective E), to 
‘Improve compliance with orders/licences’, underlines the importance of working effectively with 
probation agencies when, as participants made clear, this is difficult to achieve. Also, with one 
report noting ‘an increase in young people who are involved in gang-related offending of drug supply 
and going missing as opposed to the violent territory-based gang-related offending’, the usefulness 
of developing an integrated approach to county lines and missing persons is underscored.
Individual agencies have their own methods of quantifying success. Victim Support, for example, 
used a seven-point ‘Star Project Programme’ system to measure outcomes relating to education, work 
and wellbeing. (B4). Police officers highlighted reductions in knife crime (in the context of increases 
across London [A2]) and the financial savings resulting from fewer murder investigations as success 
indicators: ‘…it’s about 500 grand a year. It’s not cheap. It’s a lot cheaper than investigating a murder 
which is… it’s an opportunity cost but it’s £1.8million-ish is the figure that’s sort of agreed’ (A2). 
These various measures of success were tempered by one IGT member who described an increase in 
the number of young people (under 18) arrested for murder, stating: ‘I’ve definitely seen an increase 
in the ones that have been arrested for murder … I started in 2015 and I maybe would see one, two 
a year and it’s now, you know, one a month and it’s quite, there is, yeah, big increase in that’ (B3).
11.3 Issues
It is of course difficult to harmonise measurement of outcomes when various agencies maintain 
different norms – for example, Victim Support will not accept case studies (B4). Managing 
expectations and establishing consensus in this regard can be challenging (C1). One possible 
solution was outlined as follows:
…how do we have an established performance and evaluation framework? This would be… we have a 
performance team. So, how can we bring the IGT into that, but also so that we can then evidence all of 
the fantastic work that they do, and the outcomes for young people.  Because councils, the performance 
frameworks that we have at the moment, don’t always do that. So, it’s sort of establishing also a consistency 
to evaluation as well (A7). 
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Also, despite all the measures alluded to thus far, even putatively successful operations do not 
address the upstream origins and/or organised crime element of gang activity, a fact underlined by 
a police officer:
And I don’t think we’ve solved the issue by any means but we certainly pushed it further underground from 
a member of the public’s point of view, where if Mr Smith wanted to go and deal with drugs, it would be 
out of wherever he’s come from on a pedal cycle as quickly as he could, deal with drugs and back off (A6). 
Furthermore, existing measures do not take account of outcomes relating to the wider community. 
As one participant put it: ‘the other important thing that we need to evidence is the success of the 
team as a whole, and the purpose of it. So, moving away from the outcomes for young people, what 
difference are we making in communities to professionals, etc.’ (A7).
Recommendations 
Effectiveness: develop an integrated framework for measuring ‘effectiveness’ that 
systematically incorporates multiple indicators within the partnership.
12. What is Missing From the IGT?
12.1 Institutional absences and deficits
The key absences identified by participants were representatives of housing and education services. 
Housing services were described as conspicuous by their absence because of their importance to 
IGT work (see section 10.1 above). A representative from education was called for by three members 
of the IGT representing different agencies (B1; B3; B4), though a specific stage of education (11 to 
18) was alluded to in only one of these instances (B1). Another IGT member stressed the need for 
a counsellor as well as a psychologist (B3). This was interesting given that counselling seemed to 
be available through one of the IGT’s member agencies, but not offered to members of IGT cohorts 
as standard. The absence of a psychologist from the IGT for long periods may have contributed 
to the sense that mental health has been marginalised in relation to other diagnostic issues. A 
related innovation concerned training provision around trauma, and particularly family trauma. As 
explained by one participant: ‘they just see, you know, they see the bad side, day in, day out, what 
they don’t necessarily see is the trauma that young kids see … Yeah, so that kind of, maybe some 
training around that would be helpful’ (B3). A police officer suggested Early Help could be involved 
here, given that this service deals with ‘troubled families’ and young children while also having 
access to relevant databases, which could enhance IGT work (A3).
For other team members the shortage of youth workers reinforces an unhealthy power relationship 
between young people and authority. As one participant put it, young people ‘end up with probation, 
with YOS, you know, the police land them with social workers, these are all professionals, people 
in power, where the power dynamic has them at the bottom’ (B2). Similarly, a police offer called for 
more provision and innovation around youth diversion services (A4). Those carrying out social and 
youth work themselves put the ball back in the police’s court, mooting the possibility of dedicated 
‘issue’ police officers who would be in situ for the medium-to-long term around particular issues, 
such as exploitation and county lines (E1; E2). It was proposed that a more focused approach at this 
level could lead to a rolling out of ‘gang-related interventions’ with young people. One participant 
described how such an innovation might work: ‘with the younger ones it’s more about how we’re 
doing specific gang-related interventions with them, with the hope that the social worker will be 
able to continue that. It’s as much working with the social worker and the professional network as 
it is with that individual’ (C2).
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12.2 Capacity-building and Co-production  
Capacity building and the need to forge better connections outside the IGT were discussed by many 
participants. Given the shift in focus to a younger cohort, better engagement with younger children 
was required and, by extension, more efficient early flag and subsequent intervention systems. As 
a police officer explained, ‘Because unfortunately by the time you get to 10, 11, it’s almost too late’ 
(A6). More school- and teacher-focused work could be conducted, especially in primary schools (A2; 
A4; C2). A police officer stressed that this would not necessarily entail blanket ‘awareness’ sessions 
at primary and junior schools, but should reflect the need to target ‘at-risk’ young people early and 
decisively, with social services retaining primary responsibility (A6; C2). That said, the development 
of provision for long-term engagement with young people, ranging from six months to several years 
in duration, was noted as an important ongoing objective by one participant (C2). 
Many participants suggested that better connections with both the families of targeted young people 
and the wider community needed to be cultivated (A4; C3). For one police officer this will require a 
return to neighbourhood policing, with more officers gathering local intelligence. The most useful 
questions researchers can answer in this setting, the officer elaborated, are: What do young people 
think of the police? Under what circumstances might they be more prepared to engage? What do 
they think of being labelled as gang members? What do they think of gang membership?’ (A3). 
The desire to foster links with the local community chimes with a Home Office recommendation from 
2012 to ‘engage with communities to ascertain whether services are appropriate to gang and youth 
violence’ (Home Office 2012). Another police officer suggested involving influential local figures in a 
Community Intervention Team for this purpose: ‘so your community intervention team for want of a 
better phrase, which is something which we’re trying to get off the ground here at the moment … So 
you know, these are people that are really important as a voice and another angle to get into some 
of these kids and try and divert them’ (A4).
For another participant better engagement would entail ‘co-production’:
I also think we’re trying to sort of embed more co-production … I think with young people and families and 
communities. I think for Islington… that’s something we probably haven’t focused on enough in this area… 
and I’m really keen for that to be a part of the IGT as well (A7). 
Other issues include the need for better support for family members (parents, siblings and partners) 
and around CSE (B1), plus the need to raise awareness of the IGT and its work, together with specific 
procedures including the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) in relation to Modern Day Slavery (B2). 
Indeed, as well as its encompassing of CSE, a police officer stated that the new Modern Slavery 
legislation was seen as ‘a real opportunity’ to combat county lines (A4).
Recommendations 
Community Links: work with young people, educational services and the wider population to 
build stronger community links and co-produce a safer Islington.
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13. Challenges for the Future
13.1 Resourcing
One participant spoke of the difficulty of keeping morale high in an uncertain funding climate 
(C1), particularly given the importance of continuity at the level of personnel, not just agencies, 
and relatedly, a continued reliance on personal networks (E1). It is difficult to give assurances to 
team members about the relative security of funding while guarding against notions of favouritism 
or, as an IGT case worker put it, the IGT being perceived as ‘a spoilt child’. Another case worker 
extrapolated from their experiences with probation agencies: ‘maybe services do… they get quite 
resentful of, “Oh, there’s money going that way but we’re sort of going without,” and I do think that 
we will experience the same sort of struggles that other people do’ (B1). 
The fact that different IGT positions are funded by different organisations complicates matters (C1), 
with some positions being reviewed annually and others being afforded greater (relative) security 
(B4). The varying timeframes of organisations and their particular criteria and/or thresholds 
concerning positive outcomes could have an important bearing on the security of the IGT going 
forward (B4).
Recommendations 
Resources: leverage resources within other parts of Islington Council (skills, culture, 
employability), private and FE/HE sectors to enhance young people’s life chances. 
13.2 Institutional change
Uncertainty about funding translates into almost constant institutional change. For the IGT’s police 
officers, work had been made more challenging by the creation of Basic Command Units and the 
merging of Islington and Camden as policing jurisdictions. As one officer described: ‘Camden and 
Islington, albeit they’re politically similar, they’re not particularly stylistically similar, they didn’t 
necessarily want to work in the same way.  Camden believe they have different problems, certainly 
different budget streams, different priorities, slightly different leanings. So that is a big challenge’ 
(A2). One participant outlined the resource-allocation implications of the merger:
They merged with Camden last year, so our resource in Islington was reduced … And then what if the 
resource all goes over the Camden, because of a murder for example, then because they’re not resourcing 
in terms of proactiveness… The police are already aware of that and where they can they continue to 
resource both, but they have to put in resource where priorities are (C1). 
Many participants echoed the Home Office in emphasising the need for better cross-borough 
information sharing. However, as alluded to above, this is difficult given the institutional asymmetry 
between Islington and Camden. 
In a challenging funding climate where unmanageable caseloads and worker burnout are a real 
concern (C1; F1), there is a need to consistently underline the role of IGT to other agencies. As one 
participant explained: 
It’s senior management being really clear about that, but also staff as well saying, “This is what we’re 
offering. This is the service… there’s definitely work there. I don’t think it’s firmly established. I think with 
some of our colleagues and partners it is, but with others it needs to be reiterated and those discussions 
need to happen going forward (C1). 
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Meeting these challenges will involve remaining innovative while clarifying the remit of the IGT. As 
already noted, clarity of purpose and remit is vital lest a misguided perception of ‘success’ invites 
a larger and potentially unworkable brief (C1). One participant noted the possibility of addressing 
the various interfaces between gangs, CSE, and county lines: ‘We’re trying to develop a model where 
it all sits under the same remit, missing, exploitation, gangs, CSE, sexually harmful behaviour, all 
under that one remit’ (E1). This sort of further integration may increase efficiency and avoid the kind of 
duplication described by one IGT member: ‘We know that we talk about the same people at each panel, 
we have for ages. And every time we try and make one more strategic, one more case base, we tend to 
come back to ‘oh we’re still talking about the same young people in different meetings’ (A7).  
For other participants, it was important to reconcile striving for the ‘reduction of risk’ with the 
acknowledgment that ‘risk is dynamic’ (C2; E1). This might include refining notions of, and the 
ability to measure, ‘impactful activities’, as a case worker suggested (C4), and making all agencies 
aware that information can be shared without divulging the identities of young people with the aim 
of reducing duplication:
They don’t realise that there’s a level where you can protect your source, for a young person that you’re working 
with … information sharing, information gathering, is something we need to work on… Any information 
that’s given to police is evaluated according to whether it’s a source that’s provided information before, how 
reliable they are and who it can be shared with. And you don’t even need to have that young person’s name 
on there (A1). 
13.3 Legislative change
Legislation pertaining to the handling of information may also represent a challenge. A recent 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) report issued an Enforcement Notice to the MPS on the 
grounds that the Gangs Matrix breached the provisions of the 1988 Data Protection Act, while the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) meant the IGT was unable to determine whether there 
had been a reduction in the percentage of its cohort that had been arrested (Objective B). Taking 
greater account of this legislation and its impact on determining objectives as well as measuring 
success will be necessary going forward.
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